

REMARKS

In the Final Office Action¹, the Examiner rejected claims 1 and 7-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,865,608 to Hunter ("Hunter") in view of U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0039241 to Park et al. ("Park") in further view of U.S. Patent No. 7,362,727 to O'Neill ("O'Neill");

By this amendment, Applicants propose to amend claims 1, 9, 13, and 15-17. Applicants further propose to cancel claims 7, 8, and 12. Upon entry of this amendment, claims 1, 9-11, and 13-17 would remain pending in this application.

I. Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Upon entry of this amendment, the rejection of canceled claims 7, 8, and 12 would be rendered moot.

Applicants respectfully traverse the rejection of claims 1, 9-11, and 13-17 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). No *prima facie* case of obviousness has been established.

The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious. Such an analysis should be made explicit and cannot be premised upon mere conclusory statements. MPEP § 2142, 8th Ed., Rev. 7 (July 2008). "A conclusion of obviousness requires that the references(s) relied upon be enabling in that it put the public in possession of the claimed invention." MPEP § 2145. Furthermore, "[t]he mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the

¹ The Final Office Action contains statements reflecting characterizations of the related art and the claims. Regardless of whether any such statement is identified herein, Applicants decline to automatically subscribe to any statement or characterization in the Final Office Action.

results would have been predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art” at the time the invention was made. MPEP § 2143.01(III), internal citation omitted. Moreover, “[i]n determining the differences between the prior art and the claims, the question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious.” MPEP § 2141.02(I), internal citations omitted (emphasis in original).

“[T]he framework for the objective analysis for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is stated in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966).... The factual inquiries . . . [include determining the scope and content of the prior art and] . . . [a]scertaining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.” MPEP § 2141(II). “Office personnel must explain why the difference(s) between the prior art and the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.” MPEP § 2141(III). In this application, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established because the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Accordingly, the Office Action has failed to clearly articulate a reason why the prior art would have rendered the claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.

A. Claim 1

Claim 1, if amended as proposed herein, would recite a combination including “determining whether the received internet connection request signal is a number domain connection request signal, wherein the number domain connection request signal comprises an identifier for identifying the number domain connection request

signal, a number domain inputted by a user, and a user index for identifying the user”
and “transmitting website information corresponding to the converted letter domain to
the mobile terminal in a divided size corresponding to a size of a display of the mobile
terminal” (emphasis added). The applied references, whether taken alone or in
combination, fail to disclose or suggest at least these features.

Applicants initially note that embodiments as disclosed and claimed in the
application can receive both a number domain connection request signal and a letter
domain connection request signal.

The Examiner asserts that Hunter discloses “determining whether the received
internet connection request signal is a number domain connection request signal” and
“wherein the number domain connection request signal comprises an identifier for
identifying the number domain connection request signal, the number domain inputted
by a user, and a user index for identifying the user.” Office Action, page 5. Specifically,
the Examiner asserts “Column 5, lines 28-44 and column 9, lines 23-25 teach the user
identification code (UID) assigned to the mobile user and associate the connect request
(linkage code) with UID.” Office Action, page 5. This is incorrect. Hunter actually
teaches “[t]he registration server returns a user identification code (“UID”) to the client,
which caches it ... [t]he UID is passed to the routing serve, which can then access the
user data base and fill user data into the template URL ... [which is] returned to the
client.” Hunter, col. 5, lines 35-40. However, Hunter only discloses receiving numeric
codes. Accordingly, Hunter fails to disclose or suggest a combination including
“determining whether the received internet connection request signal is a number
domain connection request signal, wherein the number domain connection request

signal comprises an identifier for identifying the number domain connection request signal, a number domain inputted by a user, and a user index for identifying the user, as would be recited in amended claim 1 (emphasis added).

Further, the Examiner asserts that Hunter discloses "wherein the website information is transmitted in a divided size corresponding to a size of a display of the mobile terminal." Specifically, the Examiner asserts "[t]he proxy server mediate the transmission of the website information, which would include transmitting the information in appropriate size to fit the screen of the mobile." Office Action, page 5. This is incorrect. Hunter merely discloses a proxy server which mediates the transmission of the website. Hunter provides no disclosure or suggestion of "transmitting website information corresponding to the converted letter domain to the mobile terminal in a divided size corresponding to a size of a display of the mobile terminal," as would be recited in amended claim 1 (emphasis added). Further, there is no disclosure regarding dividing website information.

To the extent that the Examiner may be asserting that "transmitting website information corresponding to the converted letter domain to the mobile terminal in a divided size corresponding to a size of a display of the mobile terminal," as would be recited in claim 1 is old and well known, common knowledge, or is taking Official Notice, Applicants remind the Examiner that when relying on common knowledge, or taking Official Notice, to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), "the Board [or examiner] must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings" to satisfy the substantial evidence test. *In re Zurko*, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386, 59 USPQ2d 1693, 1697. Furthermore, if the Examiner is relying on personal knowledge to support

the finding of what is known in the art, the Examiner must provide an affidavit or declaration setting forth specific factual statements and explanation to support the finding. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(d)(2). If the Examiner maintains the rejection without providing any specific evidence from the applied references of the features that would be recited in claim 1, Applicants ask that the Examiner provide additional evidentiary evidence, either in the form of a reference or affidavit, to support the rejection.

Park fails to cure the deficiencies of Hunter. Park merely discloses “[a] telephone number DNS client 200 [which] comprises a telephone number input section 201 for receiving a telephone number inputted by a user, a domain name conversion section 202 for converting the inputted telephone number into a domain name, a first storage section 204 for storing and managing domain name cache information, and an address request section 203 for requesting an IP address corresponding to the formed fully qualified domain name (FQDN) from the telephone number DNS server 210.” Park, paragraph [0034]. Park thus fails to disclose a combination including “determining whether the received internet connection request signal is a number domain connection request signal, wherein the number domain connection request signal comprises an identifier for identifying the number domain connection request signal, a number domain inputted by a user, and a user index for identifying the user” and “transmitting website information corresponding to the converted letter domain to the mobile terminal in a divided size corresponding to a size of an LCD of the mobile terminal,” as would be recited in amended claim 1 (emphasis added).

O'Neill fails to cure the deficiencies of Hunter and Park. O'Neill discloses a method of controlling routing of packets in a connectionless routing protocol network

and thus fails to teach or suggest a combination including “determining whether the received internet connection request signal is a number domain connection request signal, wherein the number domain connection request signal comprises an identifier for identifying the number domain connection request signal, a number domain inputted by a user, and a user index for identifying the user” and “transmitting website information corresponding to the converted letter domain to the mobile terminal in a divided size corresponding to a size of a display of the mobile terminal” as would be recited in amended claim 1 (emphasis added).

Moreover, claim 1 also recites a combination including “the number domain comprises ... a first domain number ... wherein: the first domain number is a highest level domain,” as also recited in claim 1. The Examiner acknowledges that Hunter fails to disclose or suggest at least this feature at page 4 of the Office Action.

In attempt to cure this deficiency, the Examiner cites to Park asserting “the number domain comprises a first domain number and the first domain is a highest level domain refer to 0043).” Office Action, page 4. This is incorrect. The top level domain used in the system disclosed by Park only corresponds to the country number of telephone numbers whereas the recited “first domain number” consistent with the claimed embodiments may correspond to the highest level domain such as “co.kr”, “net”, “org”, and “ac.kr”. The term “the highest level domain” used in Park does not refer to the same element of Applicants’ claim 1. Therefore, Park does not disclose or suggest a combination including “the number domain comprises ... a first domain number ... wherein: the first domain number is a highest level domain,” as also recited in claim 1. Moreover, O’Neill is silent as to “the number domain comprises ... a first

domain number ... wherein: the first domain number is a highest level domain," as also recited in claim 1, and thus cannot cure the deficiencies of Hunter and Park.

Accordingly, the elements that would be recited in claim 1 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 1.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 1 is allowable. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner enter the amendment to claim 1 and withdraw the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

B. Claims 9-11

Although different in scope, independent claim 9, if amended as proposed herein, would recite similar elements as would be recited in amended claim 1. Accordingly, the elements that would be recited in claim 9 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references, for at least the reasons presented above with respect to claim 1. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary

skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 9.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 9 is allowable. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner enter the amendment to claim 9 and withdraw the rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the rejection of dependent claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

C. Claims 13 and 14

Although different in scope, independent claim 13, if amended as proposed herein, would recite similar elements as would be recited in amended claim 1. Accordingly, the elements that would be recited in claim 13 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references for at least the reasons presented above with respect to claim 1. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 13.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 13 is allowable. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner enter the amendment to claim 13 and withdraw the rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner withdraw the rejection of dependent claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

D. Claim 15

Although different in scope, independent claim 15, if amended as proposed herein, would recite similar elements as would be recited in amended claim 1. Accordingly, the elements that would be recited in claim 15 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references for at least the reasons presented above with respect to claim 1. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 15.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 15 is allowable. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner enter the amendment to claim 15 and withdraw the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

E. Claim 16

Although different in scope, independent claim 16, if amended as proposed herein, would recite similar elements as would be recited in amended claim 1. Accordingly, the elements that would be recited in claim 16 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references for at least the reasons presented above with respect to claim 1. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 16.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 16 is allowable. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner enter the amendment to claim 16 and withdraw the rejection of claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

F. Claim 17

Although different in scope, independent claim 17, if amended as proposed herein, would recite similar elements as would be recited in amended claim 1. Accordingly, the elements that would be recited in claim 17 are neither taught nor suggested by the applied references for at least the same reasons as presented above with respect to claim 1. Nor has the Examiner explained how the teachings of the references could be modified to achieve the claimed combination. Consequently, the Office Action has neither properly determined the scope and content of the prior art nor

properly ascertained the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Accordingly, no reason has been clearly articulated as to why the claim would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the prior art. Therefore, a *prima facie* case of obviousness has not been established for claim 17.

For at least the reasons above, amended claim 17 is allowable. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner enter the amendment to claim 13 and withdraw the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

II. Conclusion


Applicants respectfully request that this Amendment under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 be entered by the Examiner, placing claims 1, 9-11, and 13-17 in condition for allowance.

In view of the foregoing remarks, Applicants submit that this claimed invention, as amended, is neither anticipated nor rendered obvious in view of the prior art references cited against this application. Applicants therefore request the entry of this Amendment, the Examiner's reconsideration of the application, and the timely allowance of the pending claims.


Please grant any extensions of time required to enter this response and charge any additional required fees to our deposit account 06-0916.

Respectfully submitted,

FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
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Darrell D. Kinder, Jr.

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